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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Le but de cet article est de donner un aperçu de la structure éventuelle du marché de l'assurance IARD 
aux États-Unis si les banques continuent de pénétrer le marché de l'assurance IARD au même rythme 
qu'actuellement. À cette fin, nous étudions un marché de l'assurance où les banques ont déjà un rôle 
prépondérant, soit l'assurance titre de propriété. Nous comparons les canaux de distribution utilisés pour 
vendre l'assurance titre et les canaux utilisés par les banques pour entrer dans le marché de l'assurance  
IARD. Le marché de l'assurance titre est caractérisé par deux importantes barrières à l'entrée: les alliances 
stratégiques et les banques de transactions immobilières. Dans cet article, nous testons différents modèles 
de croissance développés en organisation industrielle où il existe des barrières à l'entrée. Nos tests 
empiriques semblent supporter le modèle de croissance basé sur le modèle circulaire de Salop. Ainsi, 
nous concluons que si les banques pénètrent de manière significative le marché de l'assurance IARD, nos 
résultats offrent un aperçu de la structure future de ce marché.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to offer a glimpse into the potential industrial organization of the property 
casualty insurance (P&C) market if banks continue to penetrate it at current rates. To do so, we study an 
insurance market where banks are already integral in distribution: Title insurance. We draw some broad 
comparisons between the distribution channels used to sell title insurance and the channel used by banks 
entering the P&C market. The title insurance industry is characterized by two major entry barriers: 
Controlled business arrangements and title plants. Although title insurance has not generated much 
academic interest compared to other insurance products, title insurance is an insurance product wherein 
the distribution process banks have traditionally been heavily involved. In this paper, we test different 
industrial organization growth models with barriers to entry. Our empirical analysis suggests that the 
current title insurance industry structure fits the Salop circular-city model. Our contention is that if banks 
continue their current trend of market penetration in property casualty markets, the results presented 
herein could potentially offer an insight into the future structure of the P&C market. 
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Historically, regulatory restrictions in the United States have limited the development of ﬁnancial
service conglomerates by segmenting the ﬁnancial services industry. As these regulatory restric-
tions have subsided, commercial banking ﬁrms have been able to diversify into traditionally non-
commercial activities such as investment banking and insurance products and services. Berger et
al. (1999) reviews the literature on both the causes and consequences of consolidation of ﬁnan-
cial services through mergers and acquisitions.1 The advantages include informational advantages,
economies of scale or scope, diversiﬁcation, cross-selling and cross-marketing. Disadvantages in-
clude conﬂicts of interest, reduction in competition, concentration of economic or political power,
diﬃculties in monitoring, or required expansion of the safety net.
With the decline in the traditional banking business and subsequent ﬁnancial innovation and
expansion into nontraditional banking areas (Allen and Santomero, 2001) banks have expanded
into the insurance arena. A prime mover of ﬁnancial services consolidation in this area was the
Citicorp-Travelers merger in 1998. Carow (2001) provided evidence that the market believed this
merger would provide the impetus to remove the barriers between banking and insurance and in-
vestors expected large banks and insurance companies to receive signiﬁcant beneﬁts. The recently
announced divestiture of Travelers by Citigroup2 may provide an indication that selling rather
than producing insurance products will allow banks to generate many of the beneﬁts of oﬀering
consolidated ﬁnancial services without the inconvenience of pricing these services. The advantages
for banks of selling insurance products, including diversiﬁcation (Milbourn et al., 1999), informa-
tional advantages (Berger and Udell, 1995; Chakravarty and Scott, 1999), and complementarity in
production and economies of scope (Berger et al., 1996), can all be generated without the banks
actually underwriting the insurance contract.
The passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley/Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999 has
smoothed the way for banks to enter the insurance arena and vice-versa.3 The National Association
of Insurance Commissionners (NAIC) is aware of the possible implications for insurance of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley act. In a statement of intent,4 the NAIC vows to
1In addition, Classens and Klingebiel (2001) provide a more international literature review of the advantages and
disadvantages of integrated banking.
2While Citigroup plans to divest itself of Travelers there is still an agreement in place for cross-marketing of the
two ﬁrms’ products.
3Gramm-Leach-Bliley broadened the ability of banks to sell insurance products in four ways: 1- expanded the
insurance sales authority for subsidiaries of national banks (no town size restrictions); 2- protects national banks
and their subsidiaries from burdensome state requirements in sales and cross-marketing activities; 3- provide for
uniformity in multistate licensing of agents; 4- permit a bank to aﬃliate with an insurance carrier (ABIA Legislative,
Litigation, and Regulatory Report, Nov. 9, 1999).
4http://www.naic.org/GLBA/Final_Statement_of_Intent.pdf
1"... undertake a thorough review of our respective state laws to determine needed
regulatory or statutory changes to achieve functional regulation as contemplated by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Anti-aﬃliation statutes, licensure laws, demutualization
statutes, and various essential consumer protections, including sales and privacy provi-
sions, will be part of this review" (page 2).
This statement goes to the core of the insurance industry’s preoccupation with banks entering
insurance markets. Although aﬃliation is common in both title insurance and credit insurance,
it is almost unheard of in other lines of insurance such as in the diﬀerent property and casualty
(P&C) insurance lines of business.5 Mutual insurance companies may be pressured to demutualize
in order to be acquired by banks. The distribution of insurance will also be transformed as banks
enter the market. Regulation of these three aspects needs reform. Banks account for approximately
$45 billion in insurance premiums in the year 2000. This amounts to about 6% of the total $735
billion in premiums written that year. While most of this premium was paid to purchase annuities,
growth in both commercial and personal lines of P&C insurance written by banks was more than
ten times higher than the roughly 2% growth in premium that the P&C industry saw over the years
1997 to 2000. Table 1 in the Appendix (all tables are in the appendix) presents the expansion of
banks in the P&C insurance market.
The 2001 American Bankers Insurance Association study shows that bank acquisitions of in-
dependent insurance agencies tends to be the preferred entrance strategy for distribution of P&C
insurance products. While research has shown that bank entry into other ﬁnancial services ﬁelds,
such as corporate securities underwriting (see Gande, Puri and Saunders, 1999), has provided ev-
idence that bank entry increased competition, Saunders (1999) raises the point that competitive
eﬀects may diﬀer based on the type of entry vehicle used (de novo vs. acquisition) in the securities
arena. Where de novo entry may indeed increase competition, acquisition may, however, decrease
the number of competitors in the marketplace. Therefore, the form of entry would need to be
closely monitored to determine the overall beneﬁts of consolidation.
Bank entrance strategy into the P&C market bears a resemblance to controlled or aﬃliated
business arrangements prominent in the title insurance industry. Consolidated closing services
oﬀered by the mortgage lender during real estate transactions often include a referral to a particular
title insurance agent. Frequently, the mortgage lender has ownership interest in the recommended
agent. This ownership interest is known as a controlled or aﬃliated business arrangement and acts
as a barrier to entry into the title insurance market. Examination of the market structure of title
5The most important personal lines of business in the property and casualty insurance industry are automobile
insurance and homeowner insurance.
2insurance, where banks/mortgage lenders have traditionally played a large role in distribution, may
shed some light on one of the potential directions that the distribution of ﬁnancial services may be
heading. What eﬀect will agency acquisition have on the industrial organization of the ﬁnancial
services market? More speciﬁcally, how much should banks be investing in agencies similar to the
controlled business arrangements prevalent in mortgage lending?
O nt o po fo ﬀering an insight into the possible future structure of the P&C insurance market,
our paper has a double purpose. First, it documents the existence in the title insurance industry of
particular entry barriers known as title plants and controlled (or aﬃliated) business arrangements.
Second, it presents four diﬀerent industrial organization growth model of the title insurance industry
for which an empirical test is conducted using state level data from 1996 to 2000. This data was
purchased from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).6 We ﬁnd that the
Salop circular city model best explains the industrial organization of the title insurance industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section will discuss title insurance
and the barriers to entry in the title insurance market. Section 3 presents the barrier to entry
and title insurance literature. Section 4 contains the theoretical model with the associated testable
hypotheses. In section 5 we present the data and the methodology used to test the hypotheses.
Section 6 presents our results. Finally, we conclude with section 7.
2 The Title Insurance Industry
Growth of the real estate industry in the United States in the last decade has given rise to signiﬁcant
proﬁt opportunities for companies involved in the process. Builders, mortgage lenders, and realtors
have all beneﬁted from the increased activity. Title insurance companies are another essential
participant in real estate transactions. They have not, however, received as much attention in trade
journals as the other participants. Banks and other mortgage lenders require borrowers to produce
a valid title for the mortgaged property, as the number of real estate transactions increases, so does
the business for title insurers. Although title insurance has not generated much academic interest
compared to other insurance products, in terms of direct premiums written it is larger than many
P&C insurance lines including medical malpractice.
Title insurance is a unique form of insurance. The premium is paid only once, at the time
where the property is purchased and represents only a small fraction of closing costs associated
with a mortgage. Title insurance protects buyers and their mortgage lenders against sellers who
are selling assets that are not theirs, or not theirs entirely. For example, a title insurance policy
6The authors would like to thank HEC - Montréal for sponsoring this data purchase.
3will protect the buyer against title defect such as lien or unknown property claims that the seller
failed to mention, or did not know existed.
In addition, very little of the premium is reserved to cover future claims, as most of the premium
is used to cover expenses incurred in the title search. Title searches require the examination of
a vast number of legal documents that trace the title of the property through all the previous
owners. Although some states have central oﬃces that accumulate all the relevant information
on real estate transactions, other states require that each title insurer have its own real estate
transaction database; these databases are known as a title plant. Where they are mandatory, title
plants represent a signiﬁcant barrier to entry. A potential entrant into a state where a title plant
is requires will need to gain access to an existing title plant from an incumbent title insurer (either
by purchasing the title plant or leasing it) or construct one from the bottom up.
Although the insurance literature generally agrees that minimum capital standards are entry
barriers, regulators are more concerned with solvency issues than with lack of competition issues so
that substantial capital becomes necessary. On top of the usual capital standards, title insurers face
two other entry barriers that are arguably more important than the minimum capital standards.
These two other signiﬁcant barriers to entry in the title insurance market are known as title plants
and controlled business arrangements. In such, any potential entrant into a title insurance market
may not only need to own its own title plant, but may also need to start building arrangements
with local businesses involved in real estate transactions. In the real estate industry this latter
barrier is known as a controlled (or aﬃliated) business arrangements. Barriers associated with title
plants are more unique to the title insurance industry in that some states require title insurers to
own or have access to one.
2.1 Controlled or Aﬃliated Business Arrangements
In the real estate industry, controlled business arrangement (CBA’s), are deﬁned as the ownership of
one provider in a real estate transaction by another provider (see Palomar, 1997). Aﬃliated Business
Arrangements (AfBA’s) are deﬁn e da sa na r r a n g e m e n ti nw h i c hap e r s o nw h oi si np o s i t i o nt or e f e r
business as part of a real estate transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan has either
an aﬃliate relationship or direct ownership interest of more than 1% in the provider of settlement
services. Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), controlled or aﬃliated
business arrangements are allowed as long as the consumer is informed of the relationship among
service providers and no rebates or kickbacks are exchanged between service providers.7 Rebates
7The only beneﬁt that the person referring the business is allowed to gain is their normal ownership income from
the service provider, they may not directly receive income based on their referrals.
4and kickbacks are prohibited to prevent reverse competition, whereby title insurers oﬀer substantial
rebates to primary service providers (lenders or real estate agent) to induce them to use their
products. These rebates increase the cost of title insurance because insurers or insurance agents
need to recoup the cost of the rebates by increasing the premium charged to the consumers.
Controlled business arrangements, while facilitating one stop shopping for potential homeown-
ers, may also discourage new entry into the title insurance industry by almost requiring partnerships
with established individuals involved with the real estate transaction. Some states have limited the
amount of revenue that may be generated by controlled or aﬃliated business arrangements for title
insurers or agents.8
2.2 Title Plants
Title plants essentially duplicate all the public records for land property in a given locality and
are the primary source of data for title searches. The title insurer (or the title agent) maintains
these plants, required by statute in some states. In these title plant states,t i t l ep l a n t sm u s tm e e t
some minimum requirements (Koch, 1993). Title insurers competing in the title plant states may
meet title plant requirements by owning, leasing or sharing title plants with other title insurers.
While only seven states explicitly require title plants (see Palomar, 1997), based on reported title
plant values, there appear to be 34 states in which insurers lists a title plants as an asset. The
other ﬁfteen states (non-title plant states) are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah
and Washington.9 Of the 33 title insurers in the United States that do not list any title plant as
an asset in 1996, 17 are either members of a group where at least one member had a title plant or
had no direct premiums written in 1996. For the remaining 16 ﬁrms, two rented title plants and
14 only wrote business in non-title plant states. Regardless of statutory requirement, ownership
or access to a title plant gives title insurers a competitive advantage over competitors who do not
have access.
It should also be noted that technological advances have aided in the cost eﬀectiveness of
title plants. Title insurers are becoming more automated in all aspects of operations, including
order taking, title searches and policy issuance (BestWeek, 1996). These advances, along with the
computerization of the public record, should enable title insurers to more eﬃciently maintain the
title plants, increase proﬁt margin, and reduce the barrier to entry that title plants may present.
8As of 1997, Kansas limited income from CBA’s or AfBA’s to 20%, California to 50%, Michigan to 15%, Colorado
a n dU t a ht o3 31 / 3 % ,W y o m i n gt o2 5 %a n dN e b r a s k at o2 0 %( s e eP a l o m a r1 9 9 7 ) .
9Although the state of New York requires title insurers to have access to a title plant, it does not allow title
insurers to list the title plant as an admitted asset.
5Title plants currently remain signiﬁc a n te n t r yb a r r i e r sa si ti ss h o w ni nT a b l e2 .T oc o n s t r u c t
this table we divided the states into title plant and non-title plant states and conducted a simple
test on means and medians indicating the impact of title plant requirements on companies operating
in a state. The proﬁtability measure10 is the only measure that is not signiﬁcant with regards to
title plant requirements. We see that title plant requirements have an important impact on the
structure of the diﬀerent state markets for title insurance. In title plant states, there are fewer
companies, fewer independent companies11 and market concentration is higher than in non-title
plant states. An interesting ﬁnding presented in Table 2 is the fact that title insurers seem to
be substituting one barrier (title plants) for another (controlled business arrangements). Indeed,
we see that title insurers seem to derive proportionally more income from controlled business
arrangements in non-title plant states than in title plant states. If this measures the importance
of bank referrals, this diﬀerence may indicate that consumers search less in non-title plant states,
thus increasing the proﬁtability of title insurers. Controlled business arrangements entry barriers
would then compensate for easier insurer market entry into non-title plant states.
2.3 Implication for P&C insurance
The property and casualty insurance industry is similar to the title insurance industry in that
consumers rarely shop around for insurance and where referrals are the most important source of
new business for insurers. Berger et al. (1989) report the results of survey conducted almost 30
years ago by Cummins et al. (1974) which concluded that only 43 % of policyholder ever compared
premium across companies. Berger et al. (1989) also report that less than 17 % of surveyed
consumers shopped for insurance in the past year. Moreover, Cummins and Weisbart (1977) ﬁnd
that the most important source of new consumers for independent insurance agents seems to be
referrals. Similar results were found by Schlesinger and von der Schulenburg (1993) using German
data. No newer result suggest that the situation is any diﬀerent now than it was then. This suggest
that policyholders not only do not shop around much for the best price, but also that they seem
to be inﬂuenced by the opinion of others.
The analogy with title insurance is straightforward. If banks start having strategic partnership
with insurance companies, they will be in an advantageous position to recommend a particular
10Proﬁt a b i l i t yi sm e a s u r e da so n em i n u st h el o s sr a t i o( 1−
direct losses incurred
direct premiums earned). Although widely used to assess the
proﬁtability of diﬀerent insurance lines, it is not a very good measure for title insurance since a majority of premiums
collected are for the expenses incurred during the title search rather than losses. Unfortunately the NAIC annual
statement (schedule T) does not provide expenses by state as it does for premiums and losses.
11The number of companies operating per state was taken from the NAIC database. Similar to other insurance
markets, however, there are groups of title insurers under common ownership. This signiﬁcantly reduces the number
of completely independent decision centers. Companies that were members of the same group were considered one
company for the analysis presented here.
6homeowner insurer during mortgage negotiations or an automobile insurer during car loan negotia-
tions. Given the apparent high search cost of policyholders and their attitude toward recommenda-
tions, it seems logical to expect an increased value in the partnership between banks and insurers.
If that indeed becomes the case, then insurers would be willing to pay a substantial amount to
receive bank referrals. This practice would then be similar to White’s (1994) reversed competition
argument.
In the event that P&C insurers start behaving as title insurers in using banks as their main
referral service and consumers do not shop for better prices more than they are now (or if consumers
are willing to pay more for one stop shopping for all ﬁnancial services), one should expect insurers
to compete for the referrals even it that competition increases the cost of insurance policies for end
users. In other words, if insurers compete for bank referrals by investing a sizeable amount of money
on those strategic partnerships, insurers will need to charge greater premiums to policyholders to
ﬁnance such investments. This means that total premiums collected by insurers will be driven up
at the same time as their loss ratio (Loss incurred divided by premiums earned) is driven down.
It would then appear to insurance regulators that insurance companies have increased their proﬁt
margin after the integration of ﬁnancial services since they are collecting more premiums for the
same loss. Such an analysis may be erroneous, however, since the insurers’ expense ratio (total
expenses divided by premiums written) may be driven up. Regulators would then be faced with
an interesting situation where insurers are collecting more in premiums, incurring the same losses,
but paying more in expenses. Although outside of the scope of the present paper, a potential
test of such an hypothesis would be to compare the expense and loss ratio of insurance companies
that have invested in controlled business arrangments with the expense and loss ratio of insurance
companies that have not.
As it becomes more evident, the end question of banks selling insurance in their branches
will be whether such partnerships increase or decrease competition. An increase in competition
is probable if banks create their own insurance companies to compete with incumbent insurers.
On the other hand, if banks restrict their insurance insurance operations to oﬀering contracts of
existing insurance companies (in eﬀect becoming insurance agents), then one must wonder if such
an integration of ﬁnancial services will not come to the detriment of consumers. As in Saunders
(1999), the method chosen by banks to enter the P&C insurance industry will have an important
impact of the competitive nature of the industry. Our paper sheds light on that debate by observing
what happens in an insurance line whose operations is closely intertwined with that of banks.
73 Literature Review
3.1 Barrier to Entry Literature
The impact of entry barriers on ﬁrm proﬁtability has been well documented in the literature,
starting with Stackelberg (1934), Bain (1956) and Stigler (1968). Barriers to entry are often seen
as a prerequisite for a ﬁrm to gain monopoly power in a market. Without entry barriers, no non
natural monopoly would be sustainable. The seminal approach to testing empirically entry barriers
has been developed by Orr (1974) using the Canadian manufacturing market as its data source.
Recent studies by Burton et al. (1999) and Neumann et al. (2001) have reexamined the method
used by Orr, developed a new measure, or used a diﬀerent approach to measuring the strength of
the entry barriers. The work by Kang and Lee (2001) resembles more the problem faced in the
title insurance industry where a lot of the same players are competing against one another in many
diﬀerent markets, some in which entry barriers are important, and others where entry barriers are
less important. Using a model similar to Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Baik and Lee (2000), they
show that eliminating entry barriers can sometimes reduce welfare for consumers as the resources
expanded during the entry contest can exceed the gain from lowering entry barriers.
Based on early work by Bain (1966) and Pryor (1972) who documented that ﬁrm concentration
was in no way smaller in large markets as in smaller markets, one could have asserted that the level
of ﬁrm concentration in a market is independent of the size and growth of these markets. A recent
study be Neumann et al. (2001) ﬁnds the opposite since it concludes that market concentration
is signiﬁcantly smaller in larger markets, given potential entry. This is due to the fact that larger
markets can accommodate more entry, which reduces the market power of any individual ﬁrm, and
thus the size of the incumbent ﬁrms. The study also ﬁnds that concentration declines as a result
of market growth. In fact, depending on the type of market growth (a higher willingness to pay
by consumers, or a higher number of consumers), the number of ﬁrms may increase, thus reducing
concentration. When entry is not possible, they ﬁnd that concentration does not change.
Another approach used in the literature is to study the entry-inducing impact of mergers between
incumbents. Using merger simulations in randomly generated industries as in Kydland and Prescott
(1996), Werden and Loeb (1998) ﬁnd that mergers may not create enough incentives for entry. In
fact, given that entry may not be induced by these mergers, large merging ﬁrms may expect large
increases in proﬁt.
83.2 Title Insurance Literature
Contrary to the literature pertaining to barriers to entry and to the other insurance lines, the title
insurance literature numbers but a few papers. A possible reason may be that consumers pay
little attention to the title insurance component of the real estate transaction. Because the title
insurance premium represents only a small fraction of closing costs, let alone of the purchase price
of a real estate property, rate changes and/or increased entry barriers are not likely to be followed
by any adverse consumer response. State regulation may then be the only tool left to protect
consumer welfare. Unfortunately, recent research has found that this may not be enough. Bajtelsmit
and Bouzouita (1998) show that for the private passenger automobile insurance industry ﬁrm
concentration and proﬁtability are positively related regardless of state regulatory rate restrictions.
Nyce and Boyer (1998) show that the title insurance industry is relatively concentrated at the state
level. The market share of the top 5 decision centers by state is never below 70 percent. As for the
market share of the top 3 title insurance decision centers, only once is it below 50 percent (Texas).
In addition, the title insurance Herﬁndahl index is signiﬁcantly greater than larger lines of business
of P&C insurers (Nyce and Boyer 1998), as shown in Table 3.
There has been very little recent literature on title insurance. Prior to Nyce and Boyer (1998),
the most recent academic work was White (1984) who advocated the use of controlled business
arrangements in the absence of price competition in the industry. White (1984) argues that the
absence of price competition is a fundamental problem in the title insurance industry and that
controlled business arrangements and reverse competition (rebates and kickbacks) are symptoms
of that problem. White further argues that as long as price competition remains absent, controlled
business arrangements should be encouraged. He notes that since home buyers are perceived to
have little knowledge of title insurance and rely heavily on the recommendation of others involved
in the real estate transaction (recommenders), the title insurers focus their competitive eﬀorts on
attracting the recommenders rather than price competition directed at attracting the homeowners.
Therefore, title insurers are competing, but through non-price means.
4M o d e l s
The real estate market has grown in the United States in the last ten years; not only the number
of transactions, but also the dollar value of those transactions. This means that not only was there
a greater demand for title insurance services (because there were more transactions), but also that
the type of service demanded has changed because the transactions are becoming larger and larger.
In industrial organization terms, the title insurance industry has beneﬁted from horizontal growth
9(more demand for the same good) and from vertical growth (changes in preferences, because of,
say, greater wealth). The two types of market growth will not have the same impact on market
concentration depending on the type of industrial organization model used.
To ﬁnd what basic type of industrial organization model ﬁts the title insurance industry best, we
develop four models used extensively in the industrial organization literature. We ﬁrst present the
traditional Nash-Cournot game where ﬁrms compete in quantities. We then move on to a Bertrand
competition in a circular city (the Salop model) followed by a model where markets are perfectly
segmented so that each ﬁrm has local monopoly power. Finally, we present a Cournot-Nash model
where entry and exit are prohibited, so that the number of ﬁr m si sa l w a y st h es a m e . 12
In every model, we will assume a linear demand function. The inverse demand function will
then be given by p = a − bQ, where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is the total market supply. An increase in the
willingness to pay for any quantity (what is called a vertical market growth) is associated with a
higher intercept a (the inverse demand function shifts up), whereas an increase in the number of
consumers for a particular good (what is called a horizontal market growth) is associated with a
lower slope −b (the inverse demand function tilts counterclockwise). All ﬁrms are assumed to be
the same in the models.
Because there are two types of ﬁxed costs in title insurance (title plants and control business
arrangements), a ﬁrm need to consider these two ﬁxed costs in its decision. Let F represent the
controlled business arrangements ﬁxed cost. Suppose that the more a ﬁrm invests in controlled
business arrangements the lower the marginal cost of operating the title insurer. In other words,
we let the marginal cost depend on F such that c0 (F) < 0 and c00 (F) > 0,a n dc0 (∞)=0and
c00 (∞)=∞. In other words, investment in control business arrangements reduces marginal costs,
but that the reduction in marginal cost is decreasing with additional investment. The second ﬁxed
cost corresponds to the entry cost necessary for setting up a title plant in a state. Whereas the
amount invested in controlled business arrangements is an endogenous ﬁrm decision, the cost of
setting up or acquiring a title plant entry is ﬁxed for all. We shall let φ represent the cost of setting
up a title plant.
4.1 Cournot Competition
In our ﬁrst model, we use the Neumann et al. (2001) approach to Cournot Competition with
possible entry. The maximization problem for each ﬁrm i is then
max
qi,Fi
Πi =( a − bQ)qi − c(Fi)qi − Fi − φ (1)
12Although these four models are not the only industrial organization models we could have used, there have the
advantage of being simple and of oﬀering diﬀerent testable predictions.
10This yields ﬁrst order conditions
∂Πi
∂qi
= a − bQ − c(Fi) − bqi =0 (2)




= −c0 (Fi)qi − 1 =0 (4)
Only n identical ﬁrms will enter the market if
(a − bnqi − c(Fi))qi − Fi − φ =0
The ﬁrst order conditions may then be rewritten as
a − c(Fi) − b(n + 1)qi =0 (5)
−c0 (Fi)qi − 1 =0 (6)
(a − bnq − c(Fi))qi − Fi − φ =0 (7)
What we want to do is ﬁnd the impact of a change in the market (parameters a, b and φ)o nt h e
number of ﬁrms (n) on the production of each ﬁrm (q) and on the amount invested in controlled
business arrangements (F). Totally diﬀerentiating these ﬁrst order conditions yields










































































































13With F suﬃciently large, ω is indeed positive since c
00 (∞)=∞ by assumption and c
0 (∞)=0 .A n o t h e rw a yt o
see it, as is graphically presented in Neumann et al (2001), is by noting that slope
b(n+1)
−c0 > 0 is greater than slope
−c0
qc00 > 0. These two slopes are obtained by ﬁnding
dF
dq for the two ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization problem.






































Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to look at quantities sold by a ﬁrm since quan-
tities are hard to deﬁne in an insurance contract. Instead we have to rely on a ﬁrm’s rev-
enue (or income), which is a product of price and quantity (R = pqi). This value is easily
available in insurance under the heading "direct premium written". Firm revenue is given by
R =( a − bqi − b(n − 1)q)qi which yields dR
da = qi +( a − b(n + 1)q)
dqi
da > 0, dR
db = −nq2
i +
(a − b(n + 1)q)
dqi
db < 0 and dR
dφ =( a − b(n + 1)q)
dqi
dφ > 0. We therefore have the following predic-
tion matrix
dn
da > 0 dn









da > 0 dR




db < 0 dF
dφ > 0
from which we are able to draw three testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis A.1: A vertical increase in demand (+∆a)w i l lh a v en oi m p a c to nt h e
number of units produced nor on the amount invested in controlled business arrange-
ments, but the number of ﬁrms will increase as will a ﬁrm’s revenue.
Hypothesis A.2: An horizontal increase in demand (−∆b) will increase the number
of units produced, the amount invested in controlled business arrangements, a ﬁrm’s
revenue and the number of ﬁrms.
Hypothesis A.3: A greater entry barrier (+∆φ) will increase the number of units
produced, a ﬁrm’s revenue and the amount invested in controlled business arrangements,
b u ti tw i l lr e d u c et h en u m b e ro fﬁrms.
4.2 Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated product: The circular city
It has often been suggested that insurers do not compete in quantities, but rather in prices. Given
all the diﬀerent insurers and their reliance on Bests’ (and Moody’s) solvency ratings, it could be
argued that not all insurers oﬀer the same service. This means that insurers compete in prices over














where t is the distance from a consumer to ﬁrm i and pj is the closest other ﬁrm’s price.
12Suppose for now that the travel cost depends on two parameters, a and b, which we will discuss
later. The ﬁrm’s maximization problem is then
max
pi,Fi







− Fi − φ (13)
























− 1 =0 (15)








− 1 =0 (17)








− Fi − φ =0 (18)












− Fi − φ =0 (21)
What we want to do is ﬁnd the impact of a change in the market (parameters a, b and φ). This
requires a functional form for t(a,b).
We know that the circumference of the circular city if all n ﬁr m sa r et h es a m ei sg i v e nb y
nt =2 πr.S u p p o s et h a tr represents the price in the inverse demand function when all quantities
are taken into account.14 In other words, let r = P = a − bQ, where Q = nqi since all n ﬁrms are




.W e t h e n ﬁnd ∂t




14Assuming that the size of the city (as measured by its circumference) is related to the price is logical. Indeed as
a city becomes larger, the number of consumers or the travel time will increase, thus increasing the price of the good
for which the circular city is a good model.











n2 0 −c00 1
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The determinant of the ﬁrst matrix is ∆ = −
p−c
n3 c00 which is clearly negative since c00 > 0.I n v e r t i n g





















































































































dφ = − n2
p−c and p = t
n + c yields dR
dφ =( c0)
2 cn2












da > 0 dR






. We are now able to state our testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis B.1: As travel costs increase (following either a vertical increase in de-
mand, +∆a, and an horizontal increase in demand, −∆b) the price per unit will increase
and so will a ﬁrm’s revenue, but neither the number of ﬁrms nor the amount invested
in controlled business arrangements will change.
Hypothesis B.2: A greater entry barrier will reduce the number of ﬁrms, increase a
ﬁrm’s revenue and increase the amount invested in controlled business arrangements;
unfortunately, the impact on the price per unit is unknown.
4.3 Bertrand competition under monopolistic competition
Suppose now that each insurer’s product is so diﬀerentiated that each ﬁrm has a local monopoly
power. This means that each ﬁrm faces the demand function q = α
n − βp,o v e rw h i c he a c hﬁrm
14exercises monopoly power.15 Given that it is a monopoly, there is no loss in generality to suppose
that quantities are chosen instead of prices, so that the inverse demand function of ﬁrm i is given
by pi = a
n − bqi.








− qic(Fi) − Fi − φ (25)










= −c0 (Fi)qi − 1 =0 (27)






− qic(Fi) − Fi − φ =0 (28)
The ﬁrst order conditions may then be rewritten as
a
n
− 2bqi − c(Fi)=0 (29)






− qic(Fi) − Fi − φ =0 (31)

































Letting ω =2 bc00q −(c0)2 > 0 (for the same reason as in the Cournot case), the determinant of the
ﬁrst matrix is ∆ = −q a

































































dφ > 0.T h i s
gives us
dn
da > 0 dn














db < 0 dF
dφ > 0
. We are now able to state our testable hypotheses.
15We assume here that the number of ﬁrms in the market reduces the intercept of the demand curve, but that is
has no impact on the slope of the curve.
15Hypothesis C.1: A vertical increase in demand (+∆a) will increase the number of
ﬁrms, but it will have no impact on the number of units produced, on a ﬁrm’s revenue
nor on the amount invested in controlled business arrangements.
Hypothesis C.2:A nh o r i z o n t a li n c r e a s ei nd e m a n d( −∆b) will increase the number
of ﬁrms, the number of units produced, a ﬁrm’s revenue and the amount invested in
controlled business arrangements.
Hypothesis C.3: A greater entry barrier (+∆φ) will reduce the number of ﬁrms, but
increase the number of units produced, a ﬁrm’s revenue and the amount invested in
controlled business arrangements.
4.4 Blockaded entry
One ﬁnal model we will look at is the cournot competition where entry into the market is not
possible. In other words, entry is blockaded. In that case it is clear that changes in demand will have
no impact on the number of ﬁrms since the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed at its current level. Using the












da > 0 dR
db < 0 dR
dφ =0
dF
da > 0 dF
db < 0 dF
dφ =0
.
We are now able to state our testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis D.1: A vertical increase in demand (+∆a) will increase the number of
units produced, a ﬁrm’s revenue and the amount invested in controlled business arrange-
ments.
Hypothesis D.2: An horizontal increase in demand (−∆b) will increase the number
of units produced, a ﬁrm’s revenue and the amount invested in controlled business
arrangements.
Hypothesis D.3: A greater entry barrier (+∆φ) will have no impact on any of ﬁrm’s
decisions.
4.5 Competing models
The four models oﬀer diﬀerent predictions as to what impact demand shifts and entry barriers have
on the number of insurers, insurer revenue and investment in control business arrangements. We
16summarize in the following matrix the four competing models we test in this paper.
Cournot Competition
dn
da > 0 dn
db < 0 dn
dφ < 0
dR
da > 0 dR












da > 0 dR








da > 0 dn
















da > 0 dR
db < 0 dR
dφ =0
dF
da > 0 dF
db < 0 dF
dφ =0
Looking at the four models’ nine predictions, we see that one is the same in every model.
Indeed, dR
db is always predicted to be negative. This means that there are really only eight degrees
of freedom left to diﬀerentiate the four models. It is interesting to observe in the circular city model
that investment in controlled business arrangements should not be aﬀected by market growth, as
opposed to the other three models. Another interesting aspect of the models under study is that
the impact of the title plant requirement is the same for the three models where entry is possible.
Indeed, we have that title plant requirements should decrease the number of ﬁrms, increases ﬁrm
revenue and increase the amount invested in controlled business arrangements.
5D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
5.1 Data
The title insurance data was obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
It spans all 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1996 through 2000 inclusively.16 Iowa and
the District of Columbia were removed from the dataset.17 The NAIC database provides direct
premium written (from aﬃl i a t e da sw e l la sn o n - a ﬃliated operations), other income, and direct
losses (paid and incurred) by state. This database was supplemented with mortgage information
and median home prices by state from the Federal Housing Finance Board Monthly Interest Rate
Survey (MIRS). In addition, single-family building permits and population by state from the U. S.
Bureau of the Census and the Real Estate Center at Texas A&M University were utilized. Table 4
contains the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
From the theoretical models presented in the previous section, the three dependent variables
needed for analysis are the number of insurers operating in a state, average revenue by insurer and
the amount of business derived from controlled business arrangements. The number of companies
16The NAIC began compiling the title insurance database in 1996.
17According to Burke (2000), lawyers were able to successfully lobby the Iowa legislation to prohibit the sale of
title insurance in Iowa. The District of Columbia is missing data necessary for the analysis.
17operating per state was taken from the NAIC database. Similar to other insurance markets, how-
ever, there are groups of title insurers under common ownership. This signiﬁcantly reduces the
number of completely independent decision centers. Companies that were members of the same
group were considered one company for the analysis presented here. For average revenues, we
divided total premiums written by the number of ﬁrms in the state. Finally, we approximated
the percentage of business derived from controlled business arrangements by the ration of direct
premiums written originating from aﬃliated operations over total direct premiums written.18
To test for the impact of horizontal market growth and vertical market growth, we will use the
number of new building permits by state by year, and the average value of each permit. These are
proxies for the total number of real estate transactions in a state and for the total value of such
transactions. A better measure would be the actual number of transactions and the average value
of each transaction, but these measures do not seem to be available by state.19 For the state of
Texas, where building permit and total real estate transaction measures are available, the average
correlation since 1989 between the average value of housing starts and the average value of housing
sales is 98%, whereas the correlation between the number of real estate transactions and the number
of new building permits is 96%.
Given the linear demand curve, variations in the number of new building permits represents
a horizontal market growth, whereas variations in the average value of new houses represents a
vertical market growth (change in the intercept). Using the number of new building contracts to
represent the slope of our linear demand curve is logical as more people need to purchase title
i n s u r a n c e( c h a n g ei nt h es l o p eo ft h ed e m a n dc u r v e ) . A ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fn e wh o m e s
is therefore represented by a ﬂa t t e rd e m a n dc u r v e( −b decreases). As for vertical market growth,
we use the average value of each new dwelling constructed following the emission of new building
permits because consumers who are willing to purchase a more expensive home may not have the
same price-elasticity as those who want to purchase a less expensive home.
The theoretical models we developed herein suppose the existence of entry barriers. One entry
barrier in title insurance is the title plant. Some states maintain a public title plant so that every
title insurer has open access to it. Most states, however, require that each insurer maintain its
own title plants; this represents a signiﬁcant entry barrier into the market. Because of this, we
will let the entry barrier cost in our model be represented by a dummy variable for this title plant
18As noted in section 3.2, RESPA requires that consumers are notiﬁed of CBA’s but places no requirement of
reporting income from these arrangements. The NAIC annual statements however do provide at least a proxy for
revenue generated by CBA’s by reporting direct premiums written from a subsidiary, controlled or aﬃliated company
or agency.
19Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also provide housing price inﬂation indices that are aggregated at the state level.
Unfortunately, these indices are only available starting in 1997.
18requirement.
5.2 Methodology
The empirical testing of the theoretical models is done in two stages. First we estimate an ordered
probit model (equation M1) using the number of title insurers in the state as the dependent variable.
Depending on the theoretical model we examine, horizontal (hgrowth) and vertical (vgrowth)m a r k e t
growth may have an impact on the number of companies operating in a state. In addition, the
requirement to maintain a title plant (plant)m a ya l s oi n ﬂuence the number of ﬁrms operating in
a state. The testable equation is thus
# of companies = f1 (hgrowth,vgrowth,plant,CBAlimits,population) (M1)
As we can see in this equation, we also control for state population and legal limits imposed on
the proportion of income originating from controlled business arrangements. We want to control for
population because larger states are more likely to be able to sustain a large number of companies.
We also include whether a state imposes limits to the proportion of business originating from
controlled business arrangements. To account for regulatory limitations on the development of
controlled business arrangements, a control variable (CBAlimits) identifying the states that impose
limits on the proportion of business originating from CBA’s is included. The variable takes on the
value of the limit percentage in place in that state (as noted in footnote 8). This variable may aﬀect
results in two ways. The most common theory would be that limits on income from CBA’s would
reduce that income relative to other states. An alternative hypothesis would be that only states
that felt the income from CBA’s was too high would institute limitations. Univariate analysis of
percentage of income from CBA’s (see Table 5) provides evidence that the second hypothesis may
be true.
In the second stage, we use a simultaneous equations model (equation M2) to explain the average
ﬁrm revenue by state and the proportion of business generated by controlled business arrangements.
The instruments included in the simultaneous equations model are similar to the ordered probit
model’s where the theoretical model predicts the eﬀects of horizontal and vertical growth as well
as title plant requirements. The testable equation then becomes
average revenues = f2
µ
%income from CBAs,hgrowth,vgrowth,plant,
interest rates,population,# of companies
¶
(M2)
% income from CBAs = f3 (revenues,hgrowth,vgrowth,plant,CBAlimits,# of companies)
Again we want to control for state level variation in variables that may aﬀect real estate trans-
actions and thus title insurers. Control variables include the previously mentioned CBA limits,
19state population, and state level interest rates.20
6R e s u l t s
Table 5 contains the empirical results of equations M1 and M2; the number of companies, an in-
surer’s revenue, and the proportion of revenues due to Controlled Business Arrangements. The
three independent variables that are more interesting to us are the number of new building per-
mits per person (horizontal growth), the average value of new construction (vertical growth), and
w h e t h e ras t a t ei sat i t l ep l a n ts t a t e .
We can summarize our main empirical results presented in Table 6 using the following matrix:
dn




da > 0 dR






. For seven of the nine cells, this empirical model seems to imply that
the circular city approach, where the diameter of the circle is determined by the inverse demand
function, is best suited to explain the market structure of the title insurance industry. Moreover
all three cells regarding CBA’s ﬁt the circular city model. The two cells that are oﬀ are dn
da,w h i c h
was predicted to be zero yet empirically is negative and signiﬁcant, and dR
dφ, which was predicted
to be positive yet it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
When we look at our four competing theoretical models, we note that all predict that dR
db should
be negative, which we show to be true empirically. This suggests that there are really only eight
degrees of freedom that we need to test. Our empirical results suggest that dn
da < 0,w h i c hi s
inconsistent with any of the models. Indeed, two of our theoretical models (Cournot competition
and Monopolistic competition) suggested that the number of companies should increase as the
vertical demand increases. The two other theoretical models (Circular city and Blockaded entry)
p r e d i c t e dn oi m p a c to nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms of such a change in the taste of consumer or their
purchasing power. Although none of the four theoretical models predict a negative sign for dn
da,
which suggest that none ﬁt the data, we may be able to say that the latter two are less wrong than
the former two as the diﬀerence between the theoretical model and the empirical results is smaller.
Let us look at the other cell that seems to contradict the Salop circular city model. In that
20Given that our panel dataset, a ﬁxed eﬀects model may be optimal. Unfortunately, the title plant requirements
and limitations on income from CBA’s vary by state but not over time. Thus using state dummies in a ﬁxed eﬀects
model would capture any impact title plant requirements and limitations on CBA income. Our solution is to include
time and regional dummies in the analysis for ﬁxed eﬀects and keep the title plant and limits on income from CBA
variables in our analysis. One alternative model the authors attempted was to include the herﬁndahl index in place
of the title plant dummy and use a ﬁxed eﬀects model with state dummies rather than regional dummies. We felt
this was a viable alternative given the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in concentration between states with diﬀerent title plant
requirements (see Table 4). The results did not vary much with those reported in Table 5, with six of the nine cells
matching the circular city model.
20cell, it was theoretically predicted that dR
dφ be positive. The empirical results suggest, however, that
entry barriers have no impact on total revenues. The only theoretical model that seems to support
this empirical result is the Blockaded entry model; the other three models predict a positive impact
of entry barriers on total revenues. Although this result appears to support the Blockaded entry
model it does not take into account the fact that of the eight other model predictions, including dR
db
which is predicted to be negative in all the models and found to be so empirically, and dn
da which
is never predicted to be negative in any model but is empirically, ﬁve are not supported by the
empirical results. It may then be fair to say that the Blockaded entry model is rejected by the data.
For the three other models (Cournot, Salop and Monopolistic), the only predictions that vary




db . It is interesting to note that the three remain-
ing models yield the same predictions regarding the impact of entry barriers: Smaller number of
companies, more revenue and more investment in controlled business arrangements. The diﬀer-
ences between the Cournot and the Salop models rest on the impact of horizontal growth on the
number of companies (dn
db) and on the amount invested in controlled business arrangements (dF
db ),
and on the impact of a vertical market growth on the number of companies (dn
da). The Salop model
predicts that none should have an impact. On the other hand the Cournot model predicts dn
da
is to be positive and the other two to be negative. We know from an earlier discussion that the
empirical results regarding dn
da do not support either model since it is negative. With respect to the
other two predictions, however, the empirical results seems to support the Salop model since dn
db
and dF
db are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.21 We can then probably say that the Salop model
better illustrates the industrial organization of the title insurance industry than the Cournot model
especially with respect to the amount invested in CBA’s.
Finally, when we compare the Monopolistic competition model with the Salop circular city





one must conclude that the Salop model ﬁts better since three of those four predictions are supported
empirically, compared to zero for the Monopolistic model.
Table 7 summarizes our ﬁndings. We can conclude that the Blockaded model and the Mo-
nopolistic competition model ﬁt the worst the empirical results as they correctly predict only four
of the nine cells. The Cournot competition correctly predicts ﬁve of the nine cells. The Salop
model seem to be the best model to represent the Title insurance market as seven of the nine cells
are correctly predicted, including the three cells regarding CBA’s. The only two cells that are not
correctly predicted are the dn
da cell, which is never predicted to be negative in any model but is so
empirically, and the dR
dφ c e l l ,w h i c hi sc o r r e c t l yp r e d i c t e dt ob ez e r oo n l yi nt h eB l o c k a d e de n t r y
21Incidently, the joint test for these two predictions cannot reject the fact that they are both zero.
21model that otherwise does not appear to predict the results very well.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
The goal of this paper was two-fold. First we wanted to study the industrial organization of the title
insurance industry. To do so we tested four theoretical models used in the industrial organization
literature. These four models are known as Cournot, Salop’s circular city, Monopolistic competition
and Blockaded entry. We tested these four models using title insurance industry data from 1996-
2000. Our empirical results suggest that while taking into account regional and year ﬁxed eﬀects,
the model that best explains the industrial organization of the title insurance industry appears to
be Salop’s circular city model were the diameter of the circle is determined by the inverse demand
function.
The second and most important goal of the paper in term of public policy, was to oﬀer a glimpse
at what the property and casualty insurance industry structure may look like if banks are allowed
to become insurance referral agents, insurance agents or direct providers of insurance. As it is be-
coming more and more apparent, banks are expanding signiﬁcantly into the insurance arena. The
growth of the banking sector in the insurance industry does not come necessarily from the banks’
better underwriting or pricing technology. Rather banks can become insurance agents that could
refer clients to their insurer when negotiating mortgages or car loans. The recently announced
divestiture of Travelers by Citigroup may provide the indication that selling rather than underwrit-
ing insurance products provides banks with many of the beneﬁts of oﬀering consolidated ﬁnancial
services (diversiﬁcation, informational advantages, complementarity in production, economies of
scope, etc.) without having to price those contracts or assume their risk. The American Bankers
Insurance Association 2001 Study of Leading Banks in Insurance shows that bank acquisitions
of independent insurance agencies tends to be the preferred entrance strategy for distribution of
property/casualty insurance products. This entrance strategy bears a resemblance to controlled
or aﬃliated business arrangements prominent in the title insurance industry. Consolidated closing
services oﬀered by the mortgage lender during real estate transactions often include a referral to
a title insurance agent in which the mortgage lender has an ownership interest. This ownership
interest is known as a controlled or aﬃliated business arrangement and acts as a barrier to entry
into the title insurance market. Examination of the market structure of title insurance, where
banks/mortgage lenders have traditionally played a large role in distribution, may shed some light
on one of the potential directions that the distribution of ﬁnancial services may be heading.
With respect to this aspect of banks as insurance agents, we were particularly interested in
the controlled business arrangements aspect of the title insurance industry; our contention be-
22ing that controlled or aﬃliated business arrangements would probably be the preferred method of
entry of banks into the insurance arena (see Sauders, 1999). With respect to the impact of con-
trolled business arrangements our empirical results indicate that: 1- Vertical increases in demand
(increased willigness-to-pay for example) have no impact on the amount invested in controlled busi-
ness arrangements; 2- Horizontal increases in demand (more potential clients) increase the amount
invested in controlled business arrangements; and 3- Greater entry barriers (title plant require-
ments) increase the amount invested in controlled business arrangements. Of the four theoretical
models we presented, only the Salop circular city model predicted all three of these ﬁndings.
While bank sales of property/casualty products is still relatively small (approximately 3% of
total sales), the growth in bank sales is about ten times that of growth in the overall market. It
may then only be a matter of time before banks become an important player in the insurance
industry, just as in France and Germany where the ﬁn a n c i a ls e c t o ri sm o r ei n t e g r a t e dt h a ni nt h e
United States. Although the ownership of insurers by banks may be one way to integrate the two
ﬁnancial sectors, the Citigroup-Travelers experience may tell us that any proﬁt from integration may
come from banks distributing insurance products rather than from banks underwriting insurance
contracts. If gains from integration do come from distribution rather than underwriting, we may
see the emergence of controlled business arrangements between banks and P&C insurers where
banks become the preferred referral service for insurers. Such a practice already exists in the title
insurance industry where mortgage lenders may refer clients to a particular title insurance agents
during closing.
Some caveats are in order with respect to the tranposition of the title insurance industrial
organisation to P&C industry. Given the ratio of title insurance premium to a mortgage is an order
of magnitude diﬀerent from the ratio of automobile premium to car loan, the relative gain from
shopping for title insurance may be a lot less than the gain from shopping for automobile insurance.
Therefore consumers may not be willing to spend so much time shopping for title insurance as
they are for automobile insurance. This means that banks may have less power recommending a
P&C insurer compared to a title insurer. Another important diﬀerence is that title insurance is
purchased only once, at the time a mortgage is signed, whereas P&C contracts must be renewed
every year. The repeated relationship between P&C insurers and policyholders will necessarily lead
t oad i ﬀerent behavior on the part of the diﬀerent players involved compared with the once-and-
for-all aspect of title insurance. Another important aspect of title insurance is that banks will not
agree to the mortgage loan if the consumer does not produce a valid title. This may not be the
case for P&C insurance where the bank does not have as much power over the consumer (even for
a car loan) especially since P&C contracts must be purchased every year.
23Although most P&C contracts must be renewed every year, consumers rarely change insurers
more than four or ﬁve times in their lifetime. Given that the length of real estate property ownership
in the U.S. is approximately 15 years, the average concumer can probably expect to purchase title
insurance three times during their adult life. This is comparable to the number of times consumers
change automobile and homeowener insurance company.
Notwithstanding these caveats, one must be aware of the possible changes that may take place
in the P&C industry as banks become important players in the distribution of insurance policies.
These changes will be important whether banks become insurance agents or only referal partners.
Our paper suggest one possible avenue of development as convergence of ﬁnancial services increases.
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Table 1: Premiums generated by banks
Estimated 2000 Premiums
Written by Banks





Commercial Lines 5.4 24%
Personal Lines 3.7 23%
Individual Life/Health 2.1 17%
Source: 2001 American Bankers Insurance Association (ABIA) Study of Leading Banks in Insurance.
TABLE 2: Diﬀe r e n c e si nm e a n sa n di nm e d i a n s .








































































a− All t-tests for statistical diﬀerences in means were signiﬁcant at the 1% level except
for Proﬁtability. All variances are statistically diﬀerent between the two samples except
for Top-3 Market Share and Top-5 Market Share.
b− Two-sided Median Two-Sample tests are signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all except
Independent Companies Market Share (5% level) and Proﬁtability (not signiﬁcant).






Herﬁndahl 0.1286 0.0740 0.0644 0.0600
Source: NAIC P&C Insurers database, NAIC 1996 Title Insurers database.







9.31 9 2.64 5 18
Price ($ ’000) 160.17 152.10 38.88 82.6 300.2
Building Permits
($ ’000)
23.35 16.29 24.00 1.26 108.61
State Population
(’000 000)
5.47 3.90 5.96 0.48 33.87
State Revenues
($ ’000 000)
135.11 59.93 227.44 2.30 1470.60
Proportion22of
Income from CBAs
0.1273 0.0604 0.1639 0 0.7950
Interest Rates % 7.47 7.49 0.3785 6.65 8.31
TABLE 5: Diﬀe r e n c e si nm e a n sa n di nm e d i a n s .
States with CBA limits versus States without CBA limits.
States with CBA limits States without any limits










a− All t-tests for statistical diﬀerences in means were signiﬁcant at the 1% level except.
b− Two-sided Median Two-Sample tests are signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all except.
22Just for comparison, where as controlled business arrangements accounted for about 13 % of title insurance sales,
bank sales of propety and casualty insurance averaged around 3 % in 2000.
29TABLE 6: Regression Results.
The determinants of the number of companies, average revenue
and the importance of aﬃliated business.
The number of companies is found using an ordered probit regression. The regressions for
the average company revenue and the precentage of aﬃliated business in total revenues uses


































































#o fS i g n i ﬁcant
Year Dummies
2o f4 2o f4 1o f4
#o fS i g n i ﬁcant
Regional Dummies
3o f5 3o f5 1o f5
Number of Observations 245 245 245
Log-likelihood Value -388.20
Adjusted R2 0.692 0.541
Value of coeﬃcient, standard error in parentheses.
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
30TABLE 7: Comparison of Empiricasl Results with Model Hypotheses.
The ﬁrst sign in each box is the empirical ﬁnding. The second sign is the hypothesized sign for
the Cournot model. The third, fourth and ﬁfth sign are the hypothesized signs for the Circular
city, the Monopolistic competition and the Blockaded entry models. The vertical explantory
variable is assumed to have no impact (∅) on the horizontal explained variable if its sign is not
signiﬁcant at the 5 % level or better are presented; the symbols + and - mean that the variable
















Title Plant −−−−∅ ∅ +++∅ ++++∅
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